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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee/Respondent,
CaseNo.20050001-SC

vs.
RALPH LEVIN,
Appellant/Petitioner.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
**

icis

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYED THE INCORRECT
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court of appeals has not consistently applied the same standard of review to
Miranda cases. For example, under one standard, the trial court's factual findings are
reviewed for clear error while its ultimate legal conclusions are reviewed nondeferentially for correctness. (Br. of Pet. at 20). Under another standard, the trial court's
application of the legal standard to the facts is given a measure of discretion. (Br. of
Resp. at 12).
The State does not disagree that the court of appeals has applied two different
standards of review, but argues that "this is irrelevant." (Br. of Resp. at 12). To the
contrary, the fact that the court of appeals has not consistently applied a uniform standard
of review to Miranda cases and the fact that there is a need for a consistent, uniform
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standard of review shows that the split in the court of appeals is highly relevant and
pertinent to the outcome of this case and future Miranda cases.
The State asserts that a trial court's ultimate legal conclusion should be afforded
discretion in Miranda cases "because of the variability of the factual settings" and
because the trial court is in a better position to observe "facts, such as a witness's
appearance and demeanor." (Br. of Resp. at 10, 15). There has been much discussion and
debate regarding standards of review and what amount of discretion, if any, should be
given to trial courts for ultimate legal conclusions on mixed questions of law and fact. A
few examples include State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), State v. Pena, 869
p.2d 932 (Utah 1994), and State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 103 P.3d 699.
In Thurman, this Court recognized the numerous problems associated with a single
trial judge's ultimate legal conclusion being afforded discretion. This Court observed
that "while the trial court is primarily concerned with the proper resolution of factual
issues under the controlling law, the appellate court addresses itself to the clarity and
correctness of the developing law in order to provide unambiguous direction to those
whose further rights and responsibilities are affected." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. The
Thurman Court adopted a "two-standard" approach for Fourth Amendment consent
issues which "takes into account the relative functions of the trial and appellate courts
while ensuring the consistent and uniform protection of a fundamental civil liberty." The
Court stated:
On one hand, the application of the clearly erroneous standard to the trial court's
factual findings recognizes the trial court's advantaged position in judging
credibility and resolving evidentiary conflicts. On the other hand, the application

of the correction standard to the trial court's ultimate voluntariness determination
acknowledges that a single trial judge is in an inferior position to determine what
the legal content of voluntariness should be and that a panel of appellate judges,
with their collective experience and their broader perspective, is better suited to
that task. Also, the decision of the appellate panel is published, thereby providing
state-wide standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials.
M a t 1271.
The Court further explained the reasoning as to why non-deferential review is
appropriate:
[T]he concept of "voluntariness" reflects a balance between the need for effective
law enforcement and society's belief that the coercive powers of law enforcement
must not be unfairly exercised. Declaring whether certain police conduct is or is
not unfairly coercive sets the norms that fix the limits of acceptable police
behavior. There can be little question that establishing such norms involves
substantive policy judgments and that such norms should have jurisdiction-wide
application. These are functions classically reserved to multi-judge appellate
panels. In short, what constitutes unfairly coercive police behavior should not
vary from courtroom to courtroom within Utah. This end is best accomplished by
viewing the ultimate conclusion that consent was voluntary or involuntary as a
question of law, reviewable for correctness.
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271.
In Pena, this Court considered the standard of review for reasonable-suspicion
determinations. In doing so, this Court explained that the standard of review for different
cases involving different issues varied, giving some legal conclusions broad discretion
and others very limited, or even de novo review. Pena, 869 P.2d at 938. The Pena Court
employed the judicial pasture metaphor to show that it was necessary in some instances
to grant broad discretion to the trial court, and that in other situations, the interest of
having uniform legal rules and preserving constitutional rights called for a limited or nondeferential standard of review. Id. at 938-939.
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The Pena Court concluded that the appropriate standard of review for reasonable
suspicion determinations is one of non-deference. Pena, 869 P.2d at 939. However, the
Pena Court then added that the reasonable suspicion legal standard "is one that conveys a
measure of discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard to a given set of
facts. Precisely how much discretion we cannot say, but we would not anticipate a close,
de novo review. On the other hand, a sufficiently careful review is necessary to assure
that the purposes of the reasonable-suspicion requirement are served.'' Id.
Thus, under Pena, while the standard of review for reasonable suspicion
determination is one that is reviewed non-deferentially, appellate courts are to allow
some amount of discretion to a trial court, but no one can say how much. Levin asserts
that the progeny of Pena and the unclear amount of deference trial court's are to be given
has resulted in an inconsistent application of the law - results clearly anticipated and
warned against in Thurman.
Recently, this Court distanced itself from the troublesome deferential standard of
review set forth in Pena and adopted a non-deferential standard of review for Fourth
Amendment cases in State v. Brake. This Court revisited the judicial pasture metaphor
utilized in Pena and expounded on the troubles that appellate courts have with giving
deference to trial courts for mixed questions of law and fact. Brake, 2004 UT 95 at ^[13.
This Court observed that "[considerations of policy play a central part in the placement
of discretionary fences." Id. at ^[14. For this reason, the Pena Court "singled out as an
example of this phenomenon our determination to treat without deference trial court
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rulings involving the legality of consent to a search in State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256
(Utah 1993)." Id. Quoting Pena, this Court further explained:
[I]n Thurman, we found that while there were varying fact patterns that would be
relevant to determinations of voluntariness of consent, they were not so
unmanageable in their variety as to outweigh the interest in having uniform legal
rules regarding consent to search, given the substantial Fourth Amendment
interests lost as a result of such consents.
Id. (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 939).
Levin asserts that it is equally important to have uniform legal rules regarding
Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights. If the State's position is adopted by
this Court, then the very concerns expressed in Brake regarding inconsistent application
of search and seizure law and the loss of substantial Fourth Amendment rights will result
in inconsistent application of Miranda case law and the loss of substantial Fifth
Amendment rights.
The State's position that there are two valid reasons to give deference to a trial
court's ultimate legal conclusion for Miranda cases does not follow the reasoning set
forth in both Thurman and Brake. For one, while the fact pattems under Fifth
Amendment issues can be varying and quite complex, they are no more varying or
complex than fact patterns under Fourth Amendment issues. In fact, there are numerous
cases where an officer's conduct results in suppression motions involving both Fourth
and Fifth Amendment issues. Fourth Amendment issues and their varied fact patterns are
no different than Fifth Amendment issues and their varied fact patterns. Just because
Fifth Amendment issues may involve varied fact patterns, "they were not so
unmanageable in their variety as to outweigh the interest in having uniform legal rules
5

regarding [Miranda issues], given the substantial [Fifth] Amendment interests lost as a
result of such [custodial interrogations]." See Brake, 2004 UT 95 at ^[14 (citations
omitted).
Moreover, under the standard of review set forth in Thurman and Brake, a trial
court's factual findings are already given deference, especially findings regarding a
witness's credibility or lack thereof. If a defendant's story lacks credibility, the trial court
makes this finding and appellate courts give this finding deference unless it is clearly
erroneous. In the interest of having uniform legal standards and uniform application of
the law, the legal conclusions, not the factual findings, are given non-deferential review.
The State asserts that the court of appeal's decision in State v. Levin, 2004 UT
App 396, 101 P.3d 846, correctly found that "the facts to which the legal rule is to be
applied are so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of
all these facts can be spelled out." (Br. of Appellee at 13, citing Levin, 2004 UT 396 at
f7). Surely, the facts of this case are not so complicated as to wholly prevent this Court
from applying the four factors set forth in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2s 1168 (Utah
1983), and determining whether Levin was in custody and subjected to interrogation for
Miranda purposes. Similar fact patterns are presented to Utah district and appellate
courts almost daily. Utah appellate courts can not hide behind the veil of complexity and
defer all judgment to trial courts feigning the preposterous assertion that no rule of law
can be spelled out to sufficiently guide lower courts. The Levin court simply abandoned
its duty and abdicated its role to the trial court. See Levin, 2004 UT 396 at f s 21-22
[affording the trial court "considerable discretion" in its ultimate legal conclusion].
6

Furthermore, the State's assertion that the facts of this case are so complex that no
rule can be formulated to assist trial courts and law officers is misguided and incorrect.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. The trial court and the appellate court made no
findings that there were disputed facts. The only fact that the State hints at being
disputable is the length of time that Levin was detained (Br. of Resp. at 19, note 5). This
fact, however, is not in dispute since Levin testified that the detention was from 60 to 90
minutes and deputy Keith testified that he did not think it was more than one hour, "but I
don't know." (R. 294: 59, 181). Additionally, there was no finding that Levin's
testimony regarding the detention lacked credibility. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, Order, attached in Br. of Pet. Since there are no factual disputes and no finding
that Levin's testimony lacked credibility, the assertion that this case is too complex and
varying to adequately draft a rule to guide lower courts lacks merit.1
In order to avoid the pitfalls warned against in Thurman resulting in inconsistent
application of the law, appellate courts must review atrial court's ultimate legal
conclusion regarding Miranda issues non-deferentially. This will insure published,
uniform legal rules to guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials.
II.

THE ERROR WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT

The State asserts that because the court of appeals considered all of the Carrier
factors, the outcome would have been the same even if non-deferential review was
applied to the trial court's legal conclusion (Br. of Resp. at 17-18). However, a quick
1

Even if there were factual disputes and findings regarding credibility, Levin asserts that the
standard set forth in Brake adequately affords trial courts substantial discretion in these findings.
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review of the court of appeal's decision shows that the Carrier factors were not
adequately considered in conjunction with the totality of the circumstances.
This discussion was set forth in Levin's original brief and it will only be
supplemented here. It should be noted that the court of appeals went through each factor
and determined that each factor in and of itself was insufficient to conclude that Levin
was in custody. See Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at ^j's 14, 16, 22. The court of appeals then
made the leap, without considering each factor taken together under the totality of the
circumstances, and hastily pronounced its conclusion. Id. at ^[23. When considering the
totality of the circumstances, it is inappropriate to cite conclusory statements from other
cases without ferreting out the totality of the circumstances that led those courts to make
the conclusions they did. It is also inappropriate to rely on such conclusory citations
without considering all the facts of this case and then make the gargantuan leap that since
the conclusory statements may not in-and-of themselves constitute custody, then Levin
was not in custody. Had the court of appeals properly cited Berkemer v. McCarty, relied
on State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996), instead of State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d
831 (Utah App. 1993), and considered all four Carrier factors together, its conclusion
would have been different.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984),
the United States Supreme Court stated and the court of appeals quoted that "Traffic
stops on a public road, even if in a relatively remote location, generally do not create the
type of situation in which 'the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police.'"
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438; Levin, 2004 UT App 396 at \\A (emphasis added). The
8

Berkemer Court explained, however, that an ordinary traffic stops is "temporary and
brief lasting "only a few minutes.'" 468 U.S. at 437. The Berkemer Court further
explained that during ordinary traffic stops, the stop is public with passerby on foot or car
witness the interaction of officer and motorist. Id. at 438. There is also uonly one or at
most two policeman" and thus, the atmosphere is not police dominated. Id.
The stop in this case was no "ordinary traffic stop" considering the length of the
detention, the remoteness of the location and lack of passerby witnesses, the fact that
three officers were present and repeatedly questioned Levin regarding drug use, the fact
that Levin was separated from the other passengers and questioned, and the various field
sobriety tests conducted. See Br. of Pet. at 30. Accordingly, the site of interrogation was
police dominated suggesting that Levin was in custody.
Moreover, State v. Strausberg, 895 P.2d 831 (Utah App. 1995), is not applicable
to the facts of this case. The defendant in Strausberg was questioned by the police in a
non-accusatory and investigative manner. Id. at 835. Moreover, the questioning
occurred shortly after the police arrived at the scene. Id. However, in this case, the court
of appeals found that the questioning by police went beyond investigative in nature,
focused on Levin, and was accusatory. Levin, 2004 UT 396 at ^fl 1. Furthermore, the
defendant in Strausberg was stopped in front of his father's home, while Levin was
questioned in a remote location near Utah Lake. Strausberg, 895 P.2d at 835. Thus, the
totality of the circumstances in Strausberg are strikingly different that the totality of the
circumstances in this case.
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Additionally, the court of appeals correctly concluded that Levin was subjected to
accusatory questioning, although it incorrectly deferred to the trial court's finding that
this questioning "was not overly accusatory." Levin, 2004 UT 396 at TJ22. As stated in
the original brief whether or not the questioning was "overly accusatory" is not relevant
to the inquiry (Br. of Pet. at 33). Levin was subjected to interrogation and was definitely
in custody since he was detained and not free to leave for at least one hour, while being
repeatedly questioned by three different officers using various forms of interrogation, all
taking place in a remote area.
Furthermore, the evidence linking Levin to the charges without his
incriminating statements is too attenuated to support a conviction. See Br. of Pet. at 36.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Levin respectfully asks this Court to reverse the court
of appeal's decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J°[_ day of September 2005.

MargarefP. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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